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Oversight of Marketing Relationships
Between Physicians




Throughout the world, complex mutually-dependent relationships exist
between physicians and pharmaceutical and medical device companies. This
article focuses on one particular aspect of these relationships--payments made
by drug and device companies to physicians and their organizations and
institutions to market drugs and devices. It is widely believed that drug and
device company marketing to physicians creates conflicts of interest that
corrupt physician judgment and increase the cost of medical care. This article
examines first the economic basis of physician/industry relationships that
causes conflicts to arise. It next considers the measures that a number of
developed countries have taken to respond to these relationships. Finally, it
proposes an approach that would comprehensively address the problems
caused by drug and device company marketing to physicians.
I The Author wishes to thank Timothy Diette and Jeff Caswell for their comments on
earlier drafts and the Lewis Center for research support.
OVERSIGHT OF MARKETING RELATIONSHIPS
I. PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS
Throughout the world, complex mutually-dependent relationships exist
between physicians and pharmaceutical and medical device companies.'
These relationships are found in research, education, and clinical practice.
They include, for example, drug and device company sponsorship of research,
fellowships, and continuing professional education; industry payments to
physicians for consulting; gifts of meals, pens, and coffee mugs to physicians,
their office staffs, and medical students; and industry involvement in the
formulation of clinical practice guidelines. Some physicians also hold equity
interests in drug or device companies or intellectual property interests in their
products. Physician-industry relationships present conflicts of interest
because the physician's primary commitment to patients in clinical practice,
students in education, and science (and patients) in research comes into
conflict with a secondary commitment to a drug or device company that offers
the physician an opportunity for financial gain.2
The literature on physician-industry conflicts of interest has generally
viewed these relationships negatively. There is a concern that industry
funding of research may bias research findings; obscure the source of
information on research results or their interpretation; or at least delay or
limit the release of research findings and sharing of data.' Industry support of
undergraduate, graduate, or continuing education may bias presentations to
favor the products of sponsors. Physicians in clinical practice may order drugs
and devices produced by firms that offer them consulting contracts or gifts or
in which they hold an equity interest rather than the products that are most
appropriate for a particular patient or most cost effective.4 Conflicts of interest
may even infect clinical practice guidelines.' Biases resulting from industry-
physician relationships may result in bad research, patient injury, and high
health care system costs.
1 See CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 170-75
(Bernard Lo & Marilyn Field eds., 2008) (documenting these relationships); Eric Campbell et
al., A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742,
1746-47 (2007) (94% of physicians in a recent survey in the United States had some type of
relationship with the pharmaceutical industry).
2 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Dennis F. Thompson, The Concept of Conflicts of Interest, in
THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 758, 760-61 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al.
eds., 2008).
' See Lo & Field, supra note 1, at 102-09; Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross,
Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic
Review, 289(4) JAMA 454, 456-59 (2004); Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple:
Restoring Scientific Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
641, 644-45 (2004); Brian C. Martinson, Melissa S. Anderson & Raymond de Vries, Scientists
Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737, 737 (2005); Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-
TrialAgreements, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2160, 2160 (2005).
' Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,
283(3) JAMA 373, 378 (2000).
5 See Lo & Field, supra note 1, at 189-210; Niteesh K. Choudhry, Henry Thomas Stelfox &
Allan S. Detsky, Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 287(5) JAMA 612, 615 (2002); Peter Q. Eichacker, Charles
Natanson & Robert L. Danner, Surviving Sepsis-Practice Guidelines, Marketing Campaigns,
and Eli Lilly, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1640, 1640 (2006).
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But there are also arguments in favor of close working relationships
between industry and physicians.6 In most countries, industry support for
research is necessary if medical research is to continue. Support from
government and from non-profit foundations is far from adequate to support
continued medical progress, and is in any event usually focused on basic
science rather than on clinical trials and product development. Industry
support for medical education may provide much needed funds to make up
for short-falls educational institutions would face if they had to depend solely
on public support and on student tuition. Industry marketing and support for
continuing professional education helps busy doctors in practice learn about
new products that may prove very beneficial to their patients, but that they
may not otherwise have learned about. Moreover, doctors are scientists
trained to think critically-it should not be assumed that a gift of a meal or pen
will distort their judgment, which a life-time of training tells them should
consider only the welfare of their patients. Conflicts of interest do not
necessarily result in bias.
But they may. Common sense tells us that financial interests do affect
judgment, or are likely to. Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence
that even small gifts, even when given without any strings attached, create an
expectation of reciprocity on both sides that distorts judgment and result in
bias.7  Tellingly, physicians who are skeptical that pharmaceutical
representatives influence their own prescribing believe that the behavior of
their colleagues is influenced by industry relationships.8 Indeed, a systematic
review of the medical literature on gifting found that gifts had a negative
effect in most instances.9 There is reason, therefore, to be cautious in
encouraging, or even permitting, financial relationships between industry and
physicians.
This article considers why physician-industry conflicts of interest exist,
how developed countries regulate them, and how they should be regulated. It
examines first the economic basis of physician-industry relationships that
causes conflicts to arise. It next considers the measures that a number of
developed countries have taken to respond to these relationships. The article
focuses primarily on industry activities best described as "marketing." It
specifically does not address in any detail industry sponsorship of research.
Industry sponsorship of research is perhaps unavoidable, and is generally
accepted as making a positive contribution, despite the concerns it raises.
Most (although not all) commentators agree that industry research funding
should be regulated rather than banned.'0 It is less clear that industry
6 See Thomas P. Stossel, Regulation of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medical Practice
and Medical Research: A Damaging Solution in Search of a Problem, 50 BIO. & MED. 54, 55-56
(2007).
SJason 
Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians
from Industry, 290(2) JAMA 252, 252 (2003); Dana Katz, Arthur L. Caplan & Jon F. Merz,
All Gifts Large and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry
Gift-Giving, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 42-43 (2003).
' Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 254.
9 Wazana, supra note 4, at 373."10 See, e.g., AAMC-AAU ADVISORY COMM., PROTECTING PATIENTS, PRESERVING
INTEGRITY, ADVANCING HEALTH: ACCELERATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COI POLICIES IN
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1-4 (2008); FASEB, CALL TO ACTION: MANAGING FINANCIAL
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marketing efforts aimed at medical education and clinical practice are
necessary. The argument for banning them, or at least for regulating them, is
stronger. This article concludes with a proposal that would ban most industry
payments to physicians for marketing, while continuing to allow drug and
device companies to advertise their products freely and providing a substitute
stream of funding for the legitimate activities that drug and device companies
now finance.
II. THE MARKET FOR DRUGS AND DEVICES
The market for drugs and devices is quite distinctive. The supply side,
demand side, and regulation of the market are each unlike those found in
typical markets.
On the supply side, the market is characterized by very high fixed costs
with relatively low variable production costs." This is particularly true with
small molecule drugs, where research and development can cost hundreds of
millions of dollars, while manufacturing costs are comparatively small.
Second, manufacturers often have considerable market power. Drugs and
devices are usually protected by patents (or sometimes trade secrets), and in
some countries by market exclusivity periods that supplement patent rights.
Intellectual property rights give breakthrough products sole dominance over
the market. Because of the high cost of developing innovator products,
companies often find it more profitable to produce new products that offer
only marginal improvements over existing products (longer lasting slow
release products, for example) or products that are therapeutically similar to
competing products that dominate lucrative markets."2 But even products
that have therapeutic equivalents often retain some market power until they
face competition from multiple generics.1 3 Many countries regulate in one way
or another the prices of drugs and devices, but regulated prices are often a
function of prices paid by other countries, and throughout most of the
developed world, prices are high and not radically different from country to
country."4
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND INDUSTRY IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 1-4 (2007); Lo
& Field, supra note 1, at 110-21.
11 The cost of developing a new drug has been estimated at over $800 million, though this
estimate is quite controversial. See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the
Cost of New Drug Development: Is it Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006).
Only about a quarter of drug company revenues are spent on production costs. Uwe E.
Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 HEALTH AFF. 136, 141 (2001).
"12 See Lenny H. Pattikawa, Longitudinal Study on the Performance of U.S.
Pharmaceutical Firms: The Increasing Role of Marketing, in RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT
2007, at 1, 1-3 (Erasmus Research Inst. of Mgmt. Series Ref. No. 20, 2007).
12 See Nina Pavcnik, Do Pharmaceutical Prices Respond to Insurance? 16-19 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20, 2000).
1" See Antonio Cabrales & Sergi Jim6nez-Martin, The Determinants of Pricing in
Pharmaceuticals: Are U.S. Prices Really Higher Than Those of Canada? 12-13 (Dept. of Econ.
and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1032, 2007);
Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, International Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals, in 2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 221, 222-23 (2008).
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On the demand side, drugs and devices usually face relatively low price
elasticity of demand.15 Health is of great value and sick patients are often
willing to pay handsomely for the restoration of health and well-being or for
protection against a worsening of their condition. An even more important
factor influencing demand is moral hazard. In developed countries, most
patients are covered by public or private insurance, or both. Patients rarely
pay the full cost of drugs and devices. Patients often face some cost-sharing
obligations, but most of the cost of a drug or device is usually borne by
insurance. Insurance coverage allows pharmaceutical companies to keep
prices high.' Moreover, purchasing decisions are often not made by the
patient, but rather by an agent - in the first instance by the physician who
must write a prescription, and beyond that by institutional formulary
committees or by national coverage determination entities that decide which
drugs and devices are available. In short, the demand mechanisms that
normally control prices are fundamentally distorted with respect to drugs and
devices.
Medicinal products are also heavily regulated. While drugs and devices
offer great value to society, they also often have serious side effects and can
cause serious injury if they malfunction or are used excessively or
inappropriately. Moreover, if harmless or ineffective products are relied upon
when effective alternatives are available, patients may suffer serious health
consequences. Developed countries, therefore, usually require that drugs and
potentially harmful devices be proven safe and effective through rigorous
testing."7 This testing is usually done through clinical trials. However, clinical
trials are limited in their length, the scope of the population that participates,
and the indications that are considered. Yet drug and device approval
agencies do not control the prescribing or use of the products themselves, and
prescribing in practice is usually not limited to the indications for which a
product is tested--off-label use is common.' There is a strong incentive,
therefore, for drug companies to conduct clinical trials and to get approval for
a relatively narrow indication and then to encourage use of the product for a
whole range of other treatments without further clinical trials.' 9
These characteristics of drug and device markets often result in troubling
relationships between manufacturers and professionals. In particular, drug
and device companies face a host of incentives to spend a great deal of money
marketing their products. As noted above, their variable production costs
tend to be low, but they are able to keep prices high because of low elasticity of
demand, moral hazard, and relative lack of competition as long as a product is
"15 See JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., NAT'L DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., THE ELASTICITY OF
DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE, 35-36 (2002)."16 Pavcnik, supra note 13, at 20.
17 This is usually done on a national basis, although in Europe it is also done at the
European level by the European Medicines Agency. For a brief description and history of the
drug approval process, see History and Future of ICH, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-
254-i.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
's See Sharon Conroy et al., Survey of Unlicensed and Off Label Drug Use in Paediatric
Wards in European Countries, 320 BMJ 79, 79 (2000); David C. Radley et al., Off-label
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006).
19 See Michael A. Steinman et al., Characteristics and Impact of Drug Detailing for
Gabapentin, 4 PLoS MED. 743, 747 (2007).
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covered by a patent or market exclusivity period. Even when products are
therapeutically equivalent, there is an incentive for aggressive marketing as
manufacturers try to differentiate their products from competitor products or
to break into a market dominated by other manufacturers.
The money that companies receive because of the difference between low
production costs and high prices can be devoted to research and development,
profit, or marketing. Companies that wish to stay in business must spend
some money, often a great deal, on research and development. But companies
also face in particular a great incentive to spend heavily on marketing.
Economic theory generally predicts that market power will result in decreased
supply of goods and in increased prices compared to what would be found in
competitive market. But in drug and device markets low elasticity of demand
means that increased demand does not necessarily result in reduced price,
thus the optimal strategy of drug and device companies is to engage in
aggressive marketing to shift the demand curve.2 ° As long as a dollar, pound,
yen, or euro spent on marketing brings in more than an additional dollar,
pound, yen, or euro after variable costs (including marketing and production
costs) are covered, marketing makes sense. In fact, while the average
manufacturing industry spends less than one percent of its sales income on
marketing, drug companies spend ten to twenty percent.2 '
The fact that drugs and devices are prescribed or ordered by physicians
rather than purchased directly by consumers also has a profound effect on the
nature of marketing. In most developed countries, direct-to-consumer brand
advertising of prescription drugs is prohibited. Even where direct-to-
consumer advertising is permitted, however, it does not really sell the product
to consumers, who cannot legally buy it without a prescription. Rather direct-
to-consumer advertising enlists consumers to pressure their doctors to order
the product.2 2  Most marketing is in fact directed at physicians, the real
decision-makers with respect to drug and device purchases, and is aimed at
persuading them to order or prescribe a particular product.23 In 2004,
pharmaceutical companies in the United States spent almost $43 billion on
marketing to physicians, $61,000 for every physician in the United States.24
Marketing can also be aimed less directly at formulary committees, guideline
committees, or at others who decide whether or not a particular product will
be covered or available to patients. The prevalence of off-label prescribing
"20 See Alan M. Garber et al., Insurance and Incentives for Medical Innovation 16 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12080, 2006).
21 Charles King III, Marketing, Product Differentiation, and Competition in the Market
for Antiulcer Drugs 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-014, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=891128. This marketing is often aimed
at getting physicians to switch from one drug to another rather than to expand a market. Id.
at 23-24.
22 Barbara Mintzes et al., Influence of Direct to Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising
and Patients' Requests on Prescribing Decisions: Two Site Cross Sectional Survey, 324 BMJ
278, 278-79 (2002).
21 See Sridhar Narayanan et al., The Informative Versus Persuasive Role of Marketing
Communication in New Product Categories: An Application to the Prescription Antihistamines
Market 4 (Univ. Chicago Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2003) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=472881.
21 Marc-Andr6 Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLoS MED. 29, 32 (2008).
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increases the incentives faced by manufacturers to market their products
aggressively, since they cannot depend on physicians or formulary or guideline
committees discovering all of the indications for which products may be used
through approved labeling.
Drug and device marketing takes place through a wide variety of
channels. First, companies advertise in professional and scientific journals.
This strategy allows drug companies to disseminate information about their
products directly to their most important audience. It also, however, makes
journals financially dependent upon them and thus vulnerable to their
influence when a journal must decide whether or not to publish an article
favorable to a product or critical of the industry.25
Second, companies sponsor medical education, including continuing
medical education which physicians may need to attend to maintain their
licensure or specialty certification. In 2000, industry sponsored 314,000
educational events for physicians in the United States.26 Traditionally drug
companies in the United States could pick the speakers for continuing
education symposia and even provide them with the text and slides for their
presentations. Although drug companies are no longer supposed to be as
directly involved in CME in the United States, they still fund over half of
continuing education, usually indirectly through commercial CME
providers.2 7 Industry CME funding amounts to over one billion dollars a year
and compliance with requirements is far from universal. 8 In some other
countries, companies continue to be more directly involved in CME.2 In the
past, continuing professional education programs were often held at resorts or
other recreational destinations and companies covered travel costs for
physicians and sometimes even for their families. Most countries now limit
payments for physician entertainment, but continuing education still takes
place in attractive settings and companies can still fund travel costs for
speakers (who sometimes do little to earn their pay) and even for CME
attendees in many countries. While most professions finance continuing
education by paying fees, the medical profession seems to believe that
continuing education is only possible if it is funded by drug and device
companies.
Third, companies play a major role in funding medical specialty societies
and even patient disease organizations.3 Companies help sponsor specialty
society annual meetings and journals and pay fees for space in exhibition halls
at society meetings. Companies often offer their own marketing programs in
tandem with specialty association meetings. Specialty societies in turn often
"25 See Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of
Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLoS MED. 364, 364 (2005)."26 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A
Policy ProposalforAcademic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429, 430 (2006).
27 Arnold S. Relman, Defending Professional Independence: ACCME's Proposed New
Guidelines for Commercial Support of CME, 289 JAMA 2418, 2418 (2003).
28 STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 110TH CONG., USE OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS BY
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS 9 (Comm. Print 2007); Lo & Field, supra note 1, at 143-
49.
29 Ray Moynihan, Doctor's Education: The Invisible Influence, 336 BMJ 416, 416 (2008).
"o See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Scrutinized Over Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2006, at Ci; Christopher Rowland, Doctors Fight Over Drug Firm Influence, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 16, 2005, at El.
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play an active role in formulating practice guidelines, which can favor
particular products or approaches to the treatment of diseases. Companies
also fund patient disease organizations, which in turn pressure government
and insurers to cover particular products or procedures.3
Fourth, companies often pay medical opinion leaders to market their
products to other doctors through consulting or "speaker's bureau"
contracts.3 2 These arrangements not only have the potential to distort the
judgment of the physician hired as a consultant or speaker, but can also be
quite effective in affecting the prescribing behavior of physicians with whom
opinion leaders interact. These operations can be quite sophisticated where
companies have access to physician prescribing data, allowing them to target
their efforts on "switching" doctors who are low prescribers of their products
and to track changes in prescribing behavior after physicians have been
exposed to a company presentation.3
Physicians also receive payments for participating in post-marketing
research. While this research can be a legitimate effort to discover longer-
term side effects of drugs or to study the safety and effectiveness of drugs in
new populations or for new indications, it is sometimes little more than a ploy
to pay doctors for prescribing a particular drug or using a particular device. 4
Doctors participating in sham research collect little useful data, which is in
any event not effectively reviewed.
Finally, companies engage in detailing. Britain has 8000 drug company
representatives, while the United States had 83,000 in the year 2000.35 It is
the responsibility of detailers to personally contact physicians or their offices
to distribute information about drugs. Detailers provide food for the office
staff and leave behind mementos of their visit. 6 These are often trivial items
- coffee mugs, pens, pads of paper--but they assure that drug and drug
company names and logos are pervasively present in medical practices.
3 7
Historically, moreover, gifts included much more expensive items such as
sports equipment or tickets to sports or entertainment events, and these
practices may continue in some countries. Drug companies also frequently
offer food, entertainment, and small gifts to doctors in training -
undergraduate or graduate medical students. These can include practice-
related gifts, such as stethoscopes or reference books. These gifts are useful to
students as they prepare for medical practice, but they also establish a bond
" See Thomas Ginsberg, Donations Tie Drug Firms and Nonprofits: Many Patient
Groups Reveal Few, if Any, Details on Relationships with Pharmaceutical Donors, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 28, 2006, at Al.
"3 Richard Smith, Curbing the Influence of the Drug Industry: A British View, 2 PLoS
MED. 821, 822 (2005).
"3 See Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 64.
14 See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed.
Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003).




36 See Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for the Pizza? Redefining the Relationships Between
Doctors and Drug Companies. 1: Entanglement, 326 BMJ 1189 (2002)."17 Christopher Sikora, Whose Pen is In Your Pocket?, 52 CANADIAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN. 394,
394 (2006).
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between the company and the future professional. Moreover, industry largess
can create dependence on the part of institutions and their leadership as well
as individual physicians. 38 Finally, drug companies often give physicians
samples or vouchers for the purchase of drugs, thus encouraging physicians to
get patients started on their products rather than on less expensive products.
Products that doctors prescribe in response to marketing may or may not
be the most appropriate for particular patients. Patients who are prescribed
inappropriate drugs may, of course, suffer side effects or experience no
remediation or even an aggravation of their medical conditions. Marketing
tends to focus on newer products, which may be safer or more effective than
older products, but which also may not have been fully tested for long term
side-effects. Several widely-publicized incidents in recent years have involved
heavily marketed drugs such as VIOXX that turned out to be dangerous or
ineffective.3 9 Heavily advertised products also tend to be more costly than
alternatives. Marketing also increases the cost of health care by leading to
overprescribing of drugs and probably over-diagnosis of illnesses.4 ° In this
way marketing drives up health care costs, which are often not directly borne
by the patient because of public or private insurance.
To sum up the argument thus far: developed countries have attempted
to encourage drug and device innovation by granting intellectual property
rights and market exclusivity and by setting prices quite high where prices are
regulated. Markets, on the other hand, generally fail to keep prices low
because of low elasticity of demand driven by moral hazard. Because high
prices are often coupled with low production costs, drug and device
companies can expand their income by expanding their markets. They do so
primarily by marketing their products to physicians, either directly through
detailing, marketing trials, or consulting payments or indirectly through
influencing medical and scientific journals, specialty societies, disease
advocacy groups, and guidelines panels. These marketing practices effectively
transfer large sums of money from patients, governments, and insurers to
drug companies, who in turn spread it throughout the health care industry,
but primarily to doctors and their organizations. Doctors, who often believe
themselves to be underpaid, have come to expect this largess, and indeed
many believe that they are entitled to it.4" The entire arrangement, however,
has the potential to corrupt medical judgment and thus to be contrary to the
interest of patients, as well as to drive up health care costs.
The question then becomes, how do various countries respond to this
situation, and what is the most appropriate response?
"3s See Charles Mather, The Pipeline and the Porcupine: Alternate Metaphors of the
Physician-Industry Relationship, 60 Soc. ScL. MED. 1323 (2005).
39 See Jeanne Lenzer, Secret US Report Surfaces on Antidepressants in Children, 329 BMJ
307, 307 (2004); Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351
NEW ENG. J.MFD. 1707, 1707 (2004).
"40 See Ray Moynihan, Iona Health & David Henry, Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical
Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BMJ 886 (2002).
"41 Frederick Sierles et al., Medical Students' Exposure to and Attitudes About Drug
Company Interactions: A National Survey, 294 JAMA 1034, 1035 (2005).
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III. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATION OF
INDUSTRY/PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
One of the most common responses is industry self-regulation through
codes of conduct. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer and Associations (IFPMA) Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing
Practices lays down a baseline for pharmaceutical promotion worldwide. In
Europe, the Code on the Promotion of Prescription-Only Medicines to, and
Interactions with, Healthcare Professionals of the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), adopted in 1991 and
revised most recently in 2007, establishes a self-regulatory framework for the
thirty pharmaceutical-producing countries of Europe. The major
pharmaceutical producing countries of Europe each also have their own
independent codes, including the recently revised Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) Code of Practice and the Code of Conduct of
the Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle fiir die Arzneimittelindustrie e.V in Germany.
In the United States, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing
Association (PhRMA) Code governs interactions between pharmaceutical
companies and professionals while the AdvaMed code governs device
manufacturers.
These codes vary from country to country in their stringency. At a
minimum they proscribe or limit the least defensible forms of marketing. The
EFPIA Code, which sets out a minimum standard for European codes,
permits companies to host promotional events and pay travel costs for
professionals to attend, but cautions companies to avoid venues that are
"'renowned' for their entertainment facilities or are 'extravagant'."42 It also
prohibits companies from offering gifts to professionals as an inducement to
prescribe a particular product, but allows "inexpensive" gifts that are "relevant
to the practice of medicine."4 3 European national codes tend to reinforce the
EFPIA Code, but contain national variations. The German Code, for example,
provides that; "Healthcare professionals shall not be unreasonably molested
by advertising," including faxes and e-mails without prior permission.44
National codes can also be more specific and detailed. The British Code
prohibits gifts with a value in excess of £6. The Japanese code is quite
permissive, allowing pharmaceutical companies to pay for transportation for
doctors attending conferences and to engage in unlimited assistance to
providers in connection with their own products.45
In general, industry codes are vague and open to interpretation. It is also
often not clear that any serious consequences follow from violating industry
codes. The EFPIA Code suggests that national associations require offending
companies to cease unpermitted activities and sanction offending companies
with a combination of publication and fines.46 Complaints of violations of the
42 EUR. FED'N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS'N, CODE ON THE PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION-
ONLY MEDICINES TO, AND INTERACTIONS WITH, HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS, §§ 9.01, 9.07.
43 Id. at §§ 10.01, 10.02.
"¢ FARM SERv. AGENCY, CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE COLLABORATION WITH HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS, § 13(1) (2004).
" Marc. Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest in Japan and the United States: Lessons
for the United States, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 343, 354 (2000).
46 EUR. FED'N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS'N, supra note 42, at art.18.
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ABPI Code in Britain are investigated by the Prescription Medicines Code of
Practice Authority (PMCPA), which investigated 127 complaints in 2007,
although many of these had to do with advertisements and a number were
brought by competing pharmaceutical companies.4 7  I know of no
independent research as to the extent to which companies are in fact
complying with marketing codes.
A second common approach to regulating these relationships is
professional association codes of conduct, which focus on the professionals
who are the targets of marketing. The World Medical Association's 2004
Statement Concerning the Relationship Between Physicians and Commercial
Enterprises is weaker than the statements of many national professional or
regulatory bodies, but at least provides a baseline for countries in which
regulation does not exist or is minimal.4" The American Medical Association
has issued an ethical opinion addressing gifts to physicians from industry and
a lengthy set of questions and answers explicating that opinion.49 It permits,
for example, gifts that are primarily for the benefit of patients and not of
substantial value (defined as around $100) and "modest" dinners, but does
not permit gifts of cash or sweepstakes offering expensive prizes.
Significantly, it does not allow pharmaceutical companies to pay for travel,
lodging, or meal expenses for physicians to attend conferences or meetings,
although it does allow funding for social events during conferences and for
travel expenses for 'bona fide faculty." The Canadian Medical Association
policy on physicians and the pharmaceutical industry prohibits industry
funding of travel expenses for physicians attending CME. It also prohibits
"receipt of personal gifts of any significant monetary or other value," and notes
that gifts of any value have been shown to have the potential to influence
clinical decisions." Finally, the Canadian policy prohibits doctors from
charging a fee to see manufacturing representatives."
In all developed countries physicians must be licensed (or in a few
countries, registered). A number of countries have professional licensure
regulations limiting industry-physician relationships. Regulatory guidance is
often quite vague. A General Medical Council Opinion of 2006, for example,
states, "You must not ask for or accept any inducement, gift or hospitality
which may affect or be seen to affect the way you prescribe for, treat, or refer
patients." The German Muster Berufsordnung likewise prohibits gifts that
are not "geringftigig" (negligible)." It also prohibits doctors from participating
in pharmaceutical advertising and requires doctors to file any contracts
between them and pharmaceutical companies with the physician licensure
47 PRESCRIPTION MED. CODE OF PRACTICE AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2007).
"4 See World Medical Association, WMA Statement concerning the Relationship between
Physicians and Commercial Enterprises,
http://www.wma.net/en/3Opublications/lopolicies/r2/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
49 See American Medical Association, Ethical Opinion E-8.061, Gifts to Physicians from
Industry, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinionSo6l.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
"5 CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY, GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICIANS IN
INTERACTIONS WITH INDUSTRY § 44 (2007).
5 I1d. § 49.
52 Hans-Dieter Lippert & R. Ratzel, Kommentar zur Musterberufsordnung der deutschen
Arzte, § 33(2)-(3) (2006) [hereinafter MBO].
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agency.53 It does permit, however, pharmaceutical companies to pay travel
costs for doctors to attend continuing education programs. 4 In France, the
Code de la Santj Publique (Article L.4113-6) prohibits doctors from receiving
gifts worth more than 304. 55 In the Netherlands both drug companies and
doctors have been fined for providing and receiving "excess hospitality."5 6
Again, however, it is hard to know how widespread noncompliance with
regulatory requirements is, or how frequently disciplinary actions are brought.
In a few countries continued licensure status depends on fulfilling
continuing medical education (CME) requirements.17  In other countries,
CME is not required, but physicians' fees may be increased or decreased based
on continuing education credits. In most countries, continuing education is
voluntary and is handled through specialty associations or colleges and
faculties. 8 Industry funding of CME seems pervasive, yet it does not seem to
be addressed by government regulation in most countries.5 9
Industry sponsorship of CME is addressed in some countries, however,
through private accreditation agencies. In the United States, the
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education accredits continuing
medical education. Accreditation is in turn required by state regulatory
boards for CME credit. The ACCME attempts to limit the control that drug
and device companies exert over continuing education that they finance. Its
standards, for example, prohibit commercial interests from dictating the
content or choosing the speakers for accredited CME activities, or for paying
travel costs for doctors receiving CME.
6°
Marketing practices can also be addressed by government regulation of
advertising. Title VIII of the European Council Directive 2001/83/EC
addresses advertising of medicinal products, including advertising to health
care professionals. Articles 94 and 95 permit drug and device companies only
to offer inexpensive gifts and hospitality to professionals. Article 97 obligates
member states to enforce the directive. In the U.K, pharmaceutical marketing
is regulated by the Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (HPRA), in
cooperation with the self-regulatory PMCPA. 6' The HPRA publishes The Blue
53 MBO §§ 33-34. See also Hans-Dieter Lippert & Rudolph Ratzel, Arzt und Industrie
nach den Besculiissen des 106. Deutschen krztetags 46 NJW 3301 (2003).
MBO § 33(4).
5 Elizabeth Wager, How to Dance with Porcupines: Rules and Guidelines on Doctor's
Relations With Drug Companies, 326 BMJ 1196, 1197 (2003).
"58 Ann McGuaran, Royal College Issues New Guidelines on Gifts from Drug Companies,
325 BMJ 511, 511 (2003).
17 See Cathy Peck et al., Continuing Medical Education GMC, Guidance on Continuing
Professional Development, International Comparisons, 320 BMJ 432, 432-33 (2000); See also
General Medical Council, Guidance on Continuing Professional Development,
http://www.gmc-uk.org/education/continuing-professional-development/cpd-guidance.asp
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
"s Peck et al., supra note 57, at 433.
'9 Moynihan, supra note 29, at 416.
60 See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION, ACCME
STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT-STANDARDS TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF CME
ACTIVITIES, 1-3 (2007).
"61 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Ass'n of the British Pharm. Indus., the
Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., and the Medicines and Healthcare Prod.
Regulatory Agency, (Nov. 3, 2005) available at
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Guide: Advertising and Promotion of Medicines in the UK, which explains the
UK Medicines Regulations, which in turn implement the EC Directive. It
contains specific interpretation of the regulations, for example, defining
"inexpensive" as not costing more that £6 (excluding VAT), and items
"relevant to the practice of medicine" as including coffee mugs.62 The United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has statutory authority to
regulate drug and device labeling and advertising."3 The FDA does not
attempt to control industry supported educational programs as long as the
programs are independently administered, as outlined in an industry
guidance." Finally, while the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
recently adopted in the United States does not limit gifts from industry to
doctors, it does require manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologics, and
medical supplies to disclose in a public, searchable database all "Payments or
other transfers of value" that they make to physicians and teaching hospitals,
subject to limited exceptions.77
Professional school faculty and employees must also abide by the policies
that govern their institution. Some medical schools in the United States have
adopted policies greatly limiting pharmaceutical promotion on campus, for
example. The Association of American Medical Colleges is currently in the
process of considering recommendations for greater restrictions on
interactions between industry and academic medical centers and their
students.6 5 In countries where professional schools are state run, laws
governing the institutions may require that the administration approve
payments that faculty receive from industry.66
Finally, relationships between industry and physicians may also raise
criminal law issues. This is particularly likely in countries where physicians
are public employees. In Germany and Japan, for example, doctors employed
by public hospitals or public educational institutions are civil servants. Gifts
or payments to them could be considered to be attempts to bribe or corrupt
public officials, which is in turn potentially a serious offense. Section 331 of
the German Civil Code prohibits a public official from accepting a benefit for
discharge of an official duty, while section 332 prohibits an official from
accepting a benefit in return for violating the officer's official duties.6 7 In a
recent decision, the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany's highest nonconstitutional
court) refused to find a university professor guilty of violating section 331
http://www.abpi.org.uk/links/assoc/PMCPA/Memo_understanding-nova.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2010).
62 MEDICINE AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS REGULATORY AGENCY, THE BLUE GUIDE:
ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION OF MEDICINES IN THE UK 30 (TSO 2005).
63 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f),(n),(q) & (r), 353 (2006).
64 See FED. DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: INDUSTRY-SUPPORTED
SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES 1, 3 (1997),
http://www.gwumc.edu/Cehp/pdf/CMEPolicies/FDAguidance.pdf.
7 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002
"65 See ASS'N AM. MED. C., INDUSTRY FUNDING OF MEDICAL EDUCATION Vi-xi (2008),
http://services.aamc.org/publications/showfile.cfm?fle=versionll4.pdf&prd-id=232.
66 See, e.g., Beamtenstatusgesetz [BeamtStG] [Civil Service Law] Feb. 5, 2009, § 42
(F.R.G.).
17 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §§ 331, 332 (F.R.G.). See ERWIN DEUTSCH &
ANDREAS SPICKHOFF, MEDIZINRECHT, ¶¶ 491, 492 ((6th ed. 2008); Lippert & Ratzel, supra
note 53, at 3304-05.
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where the doctor had received payments from a pacemaker manufacturer for
services but where there was no evidence that the services were not approved
by the university or that they had influenced treatment decisions. The court
went on to observe that prosecutions for payments received by officials from
third parties in connection with their official duties were certainly possible,
and that it was very important that university faculty disclose industry
relationships to the university administration, and receive approval where
necessary. 68 In Japan, a National Public Official Moral Code, adopted in
2000 imposes much the same constraints on doctors working at university
hospitals as are found in the German law.6 9
Physician-industry relationships are also problematic if they increase the
costs of public insurance programs. For this reason, it is illegal in the United
States for an entity such as a pharmaceutical or device company to offer or pay
"remuneration" to a physician in exchange for the referral of a patient or the
ordering of a service, or for a physician to solicit or receive such a payment.
70
Additionally, a physician may not refer a patient for a "designated health
service," including outpatient pharmaceuticals and durable medical
equipment, if the physician has an investment or compensation arrangement
with the entity providing the services,7 Both laws cover all forms of
remuneration, direct and indirect, in cash and in kind. It is, of course, always
possible for physicians or companies to argue that a payment from a company
was for something other than a referral, for example for genuine consulting
services, but if "one purpose" for a payment is to secure a referral, it violates
the law. 72
The sanctions for violation of the antikickback and self-referral laws in
the United States are potentially very serious. Violation of the antikickback
law is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. Violation of the self-
referral law results in the service for which the patient is referred not being
covered by public insurance, but intentional violation of either law can
potentially result in administrative sanctions or civil fines. Civil fraud cases
brought against companies for violation of the law in recent years have been
settled for amounts in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services has issued compliance guidance for pharmaceutical companies
identifying a number of questionable practices, including:
payments to doctors for switching patients from competing products;
illegitimate consulting or advisory payments; payments to physicians for
listening to detailers or the provision of entertainment, recreation, travel,
meals, or other benefits in association with information or marketing
presentations; gifts, gratuities, and other business courtesies; and
compensation relationships with physicians for services connected directly or
"68 See Bundsgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 25, 2003, 5 StR
[Strafsenat] 363/02 (F.R.G.).
69 Akira Akabayasbi, Brian Taylor Slingsby & Yoshiyuki Takimoto, Conflict of Interest: A
Japanese Perspective, 14 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETH. 277, 278 (2005).
7042 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2010).
71 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (2010).
72 United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3rd Cir. 1985). Actually, there isn't at this
time. There are older cases that conflict with Greber but they are based on the statute before it
was amended.
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indirectly to a manufacturer's marketing and sales activities, such as speaking,
certain research, or preceptor or "shadowing" services.
71
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have been a primary focus of fraud and
abuse enforcement in recent years. In 2007, Purdue Pharma and Purdue
Frederick agreed to pay $600 million for illegal marketing of Oxycontin,
while three of its chief executives pled guilty to criminal charges. In 2006,
Serono agreed to pay a fine of $704 million for illegal promotion of Serostim.
Among other illegal practices, Serono had paid for a number of physicians to
attend an AIDS conference in Cannes at its expense. The Department of
Justice has also recently entered into "deferred prosecution agreements" with
a number of medical device companies in which they have agreed to pay over
300 million dollars for violations of the fraud and abuse laws, and to agree to
a number of practices in the future and continuing monitoring of their
marketing practices by an independent monitor.7" It is possible that in other
counties, receipt of payments from pharmaceutical companies could be seen
as fraud as well, but in Germany, the fact that physicians have no direct
relationships with social insurers because payments are made to the
Kassendrzlichen Vereinigungen (the insurance doctors' association),which in
turn pays doctors, makes this unlikely." In other countries, the potential of
conflicts to affect medical costs is recognized but not criminalized. In
Scotland, for example, financial relationships between physicians and drug
companies are simply subject to public disclosure.76
In sum, regulation of marketing relationships between physicians and the
drug and device industry are universally addressed by regulation, self-
regulation, or criminal prohibition. Countries vary in the extent to which they
rely on each of these approaches. Countries also vary in the stringency of their
regulation. Some, for example, allow drug companies to finance physician
travel to educational events sponsored by drug companies, others do not, and
some even prohibit direct drug company funding of continuing education.
Countries also vary in the specificity and clarity of their requirements. It is
easier to evade and harder to enforce a requirement that gifts not be
"excessive" than one that they not exceed £6. All countries permit some
financial benefits to flow from industry to physicians, none of the countries
examined here permit them without limitation. But the international trend is
toward stricter limits on these relationships.
IV. HOW SHOULD INDUSTRY PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BE
REGULATED?
Drug and device companies should be prohibited from giving any gifts to
professionals who have the authority to prescribe or order their products, to
the families or employees of such professionals, or to undergraduate or
graduate professionals in training. Where drug or device companies contract
"71See OIG, supra note 34, at 23733.
74 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry Avoid
Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring 1, 2 (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/hipsO927.rel.pdf.
"71 See Deutsch & Spickhoff, supra note 67, at ¶ 493.
7' See Bryan Christie, Scottish Doctors Will Have to Register Financial Links to Drug
Companies, 328 BMJ 69, 69 (2004).
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with a professional to provide a service for remuneration, compensation
should be for a service of real value to the company for some purpose other
than marketing (or assistance in marketing to others) and the compensation
should be for the fair market value of the services and not be based on the
volume and value of referrals. Drug samples should only be made available
for patients who cannot afford the drugs, and then only when they are
appropriate and when an ongoing source of the drug is assured for chronic
cases. Drug and device companies should be absolutely prohibited from
funding medical education, including continuing medical education, directly
or indirectly. These recommendations are basically consistent with those
made recently by a committee of the Institute of Medicine (on which I
served), except that the committee, recognizing that industry funding of CME
could not be eliminated overnight, called for the development of a new system
of funding for CME to replace the current industry-funded system.
78
Drug and device companies must, of course, be allowed to continue to
market their products-in print media, electronically, through presentations
by company employees, and through face-to-face contact with physicians.
Limitation of their right to do so may be unconstitutional in several countries
as an abridgement of freedom of expression.79  But freedom of expression
does not include the right to pay professionals to use a product, or even for
their attention. Such payments should be stopped.
Ending payments from drug companies to professionals will, however,
upset the financial balance that currently exists in health systems in developed
nations. The basic thesis of this article is that drug and device companies
have been overpaid for their products and have passed on some of the excess
payments they have received to others in the health care industry through
marketing. The continuing medical education industry in particular, but also
specialty societies and even patient disease organizations and medical schools
(not to mention the office staff of doctors in clinical practice) have come to
depend on funding from the drug and device industry. In most developed
countries physicians are generously paid and should be able to afford their
own lunches without drug industry assistance, but real shortfalls may appear
in the funding of medical education and practice guideline development.
Also, physicians may face diminished access to information about new drugs
and devices.
This funding shortfall should be made up by a tax imposed on the drug
and device industry to raise funds for education and for practice guideline
development. This money could be distributed through a government agency
or through one or more nonprofit foundations formed for this purpose. Part
of this money should be used to fund new "academic detailing" programs that
would disseminate to doctors accurate, evidence-based, and unbiased
information on drugs and devices. There is a long and successful track record
for such programs in Canada, England, the Netherlands, Australia, and a
number of American states.80 The rest of the funding would be passed on to
78 Lo & Field, supra note 1.
7' See RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.) (commercial speech
protected in Canada); Aaron Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Pharmaceutical Promotion to
Physicians and FirstAmendment Rights, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1727, 1728 (2008)."o See Statement of Jerry Avorn, http://aging.senate.gov/events/hrl90ja.pdf.
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continuing medical education providers for CME, specialty societies and
patient groups for guidelines development and patient education, and perhaps
to medical schools for fellowships.8 '
Drug and device manufacturers will protest that limitations on their
marketing practices will diminish physician knowledge of new products (or
new uses of existing products), and thus harm patient care. Limits on
marketing may also reduce sales and thus the income that the industry
depends on to do research and product development. It is not obvious that
these results would follow. Drug companies will still be able to advertise their
products through traditional channels, as do other successful industries. An
adequately funded drug information agency should be able to get information
out quickly to physicians about innovative products. It is demeaning to
physicians to believe that they will inform themselves about products that will
benefit their patients only if the information comes with free pizza. Truly
superior products should thrive as their benefits are revealed by unbiased,
evidence-based information. The creators of superior products will prosper,
allowing them to pursue further innovative research. Drug companies, on the
other hand, will find little profit in "me too" products that offer no
comparative advantages to existing products unless they decide to compete
seriously on price. Educational institutions - undergraduate, graduate, and
continuing - will be able to focus their efforts on education, not on dealing
with marketing. Unbiased practice guidelines and formularies will improve
medical practice and patient care.
In the end, the goal of our health care systems is the care of patients.
Patients are not well served by current systems for marketing of drugs and
devices, the goal of which seems to be the distortion, indeed the corruption, of
medical judgment through financial inducements. Vague and easily evaded
prohibitions of particular practices are unlikely to improve the situation. On
the other hand, the total prohibition of marketing inducements is not alone
the optimal solution. Prohibition must be coupled with redirection of
financial flows so that the educational functions currently served by
marketing practices could be carried on, but in an objective and unbiased
fashion. The proposal put forth by this article would make this possible.
"s, See Brennan, supra note 26, at 431-432 (calling for funding of CME through voluntary
pooling of funding by drug companies).
